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This thesis examines Albania, one of the newest Alliance members, as a case 
study in the debate as to whether small states serve as security importers or providers in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It investigates the hypothesis that the 
benefits for NATO as a whole associated with Albania’s NATO membership outweigh 
the costs. Albania’s accession to NATO, the evolution of its roles, and its potential for 
expanded contributions are evaluated to assess the advantages and costs of Albania’s 
membership in the Alliance. This project places Albania’s NATO membership since 
2009 in the context of its independence since 1912 in order to provide insight regarding 
Albania’s decision making and motivations. It also analyzes Albania’s contributions to 
NATO during its Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership in 1994–2009 and as an 
Alliance member since 2009. This thesis concludes that despite its weak economy, 
domestic issues, and numerically small military forces, Albania is a valued member of 
the Alliance that provides important capabilities in support of NATO’s core tasks.  
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has always included small states 
among its members. Iceland and Luxembourg were, for example, among the founding 
Allies in 1949. The admission of additional small states as members has nonetheless 
become controversial in some quarters. Detractors argue that small states could 
complicate decision making and could not meaningfully contribute to the Alliance’s 
activities and operations. In the debate about NATO’s security providers and security 
importers, small states are generally viewed as security importers.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the benefits for NATO as a whole 
associated with Albania’s NATO membership outweigh the costs. Albania’s accession to 
NATO, the evolution of its role, its current role, and its potential for an expanded role in 
the future are evaluated to assess the advantages and costs of Albania’s membership in 
the Alliance. To what extent is Albania a security consumer or provider? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
NATO’s continuing enlargement process is a topic of ongoing debate among 
experts. There are arguments in favor of welcoming additional members to the Alliance 
and arguments to keep the current membership configuration. Some scholars debate the 
roles of the organization as a whole. Some speculate that the Alliance has overstepped its 
bounds in contingencies for which other international organizations might have been 
better suited to act.1 Other experts advocate that the Alliance increase in size and scope. 
One of the themes in this discussion is the inclusion of small states in the Alliance; to 
what extent are small states security providers or consumers?2  
                                                 
1 Steven E. Meyer, “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO,” Parameters, Winter 
2003/2004, 33, no. 4 (2004): 83–97. 
2 Ibid., 89. 
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NATO expanded its membership in three post–Cold War rounds of enlargement 
(1999, 2004, and 2009) involving the accession of 12 states from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Moreover, Montenegro’s accession to the Alliance is expected in 2016. 
Following the Cold War, NATO worked to adapt to the new security environment. 
According to some assessments, the threats faced by states today more frequently come 
from non-state actors than from states with standing armies. With the nature of warfare 
changing, the roles and value of Allies within NATO are also changing. Collective 
defense was the fundamental reason for the creation of the Alliance in response to the 
threat of Soviet aggression.3 The core task of collective defense remains today, but the 
way it is pursued has evolved due to the changes in warfare.  
This thesis examines the case of Albania, which gained Alliance membership in 
2009. Understanding the relationship between Albania and NATO over the past seven 
years should provide insight as to how individual states fill necessary functions within the 
Alliance, how those functions affect the significance of NATO, and specifically how 
Albania has performed since its accession to the Alliance. To what extent has it been a 
security consumer or provider? The thesis research builds on the broad topics of NATO 
enlargement, the current relevance of NATO, and the roles of small states in the Alliance. 
The thesis also assesses evidence to clarify Albania’s contributions to the fulfillment of 
NATO’s core tasks and objectives. Finally, this thesis evaluates the implications of 
Albania’s NATO membership for future small-state accessions.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Atlantic Alliance was originally created in order to deter and defend against 
possible Soviet aggression and to furnish a basis for diplomacy seeking a peaceful 
resolution to East–West differences. This unifying purpose held the Alliance together 
with little fundamental change until the Cold War ended in 1989–1991. This ending 
marked the beginning of a significant transition period for the Alliance that has spurred 
                                                 
3 Ivo H. Daalder, “NATO in the 21st Century: What Purpose? What Missions?” Brookings Institution, 
April 1999, 19, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/1999/04/nato-daalder.  
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many debates among scholars concerning the enlargement, relevance, and purposes of 
NATO. Since 1999, NATO has enlarged its ranks three times through the accession of 
12 countries. With the exception of Poland, all of these new member states are 
comparatively small Central and Eastern European nations. The inclusion of small states 
within the Alliance is a point of contention among experts that is closely tied to the 
purpose and future of NATO.  
1. NATO—Relevance and Purposes 
The relevance and purposes of NATO have provoked extensive debates among 
experts. Some experts believe that the Alliance should focus more on its collective 
defense responsibilities and assume fewer non-Article 5 tasks. Some believe that the 
Allies should devote more attention to burden-sharing in their decisions about inviting 
new members to join the Alliance. The Allies agree that the Alliance should stay relevant 
as a significant military and political international organization. All of these topics are 
worth exploring to understand the current and future state of NATO. 
David Yost is among the many experts who believe in a proper balance in the 
roles of the Alliance, while never neglecting its founding purpose. According to Yost, 
“the first priority of the Allies necessarily remains the security of their national territories, 
followed by the security of the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole.”4 Yost has written 
extensively about how NATO balances its core tasks of collective defense, crisis 
management, and cooperative security as defined in the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic 
Concept.5 The Alliance has capabilities prepared to respond in a variety of crisis 
situations, and this has been evident in the many crisis management operations conducted 
since 1992.  
These actions overlap with activities in the domain of cooperative security. Yost 
writes that in its current state, the Alliance emphasizes crisis management and 
                                                 
4 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 14. 
5 Yost, NATO's Balancing Act, 344. 
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cooperative security on the basis of a consensus on common values and shared security 
threats. With crisis management and cooperative security being exercised regularly, Yost 
believes that there should be a greater emphasis on collective defense. In his view, there 
should be a proper balance of all three tasks in order to fulfill the security commitments 
made by all NATO members.6  
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) takes a budgetary perspective on 
defense and security efforts in the Alliance. The CBO tracks trends in how NATO 
members utilize their resources in support of NATO operations and common costs. The 
CBO found that the contributions and support provided by specific Allies have fluctuated 
year by year and that physical support and financial contributions are not necessarily 
correlated.7 The CBO observed that the end of the Cold War allowed most Alliance 
members to lower their spending contributions. This increased a key imbalance in 
burden-sharing—namely that between the United States and the European Allies.8 The 
Congressional Budget Office’s findings demonstrate the imbalance present among 
NATO members in their defense spending. 
Ivo Daalder wrote in 1999 that NATO’s continued existence was required, but he 
argued that it should be more of a military organization as originally chartered and focus 
on collective defense. He held that in order to strengthen the Alliance’s defenses and 
security within Europe, more involvement and more balanced burden-sharing from 
member states are necessary. He also maintained that the Alliance should focus on 
enhancing its power-projection capabilities.9 The implementation of this acquisition 
policy would include improved command and control, intelligence, and airlift 
capabilities. Finally, he wrote that this effort is intended to increase security in the Euro–
Atlantic region while maintaining the previous progress made by the Alliance. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 377. 
7 Congressional Budget Office, NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Budget Office, August 2001), ix. 
8 Ibid., 1. 
9 Daalder, “NATO in the 21st Century.”  
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Ultimately, Daalder stated that NATO’s purpose during the Cold War was mainly to 
serve as a military alliance while today it is a more political alliance. Despite this shift in 
circumstances, he argued that the central role of the Alliance has been and should always 
be collective defense.10 
2. Enlargement—Critical Arguments 
The enlargement of NATO in recent years has been synonymous with adding 
small states to the Alliance. NATO’s enlargement has divided experts, who have 
articulated arguments for and against it. The arguments for enlargement have included 
the need for a stronger military posture to deter Russian aggression, an increase of the 
Alliance’s sphere of responsibility, and increased stability in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Some experts argue that the enlargement process has kept the Alliance both politically 
and militarily strong. The arguments against enlargement include the contentions that a 
bigger Alliance means a greater risk of irritating the Russians, that additional small states 
have little to offer, and that the inclusion of small states may actually weaken the 
Alliance.  
Steven Meyer wrote in 2003 that NATO should be abolished, partly because of 
the problems presented by the enlargement process. He based his opposition to NATO 
enlargement—and NATO’s existence—on political complications created by adding new 
Allies to NATO. In his view, this started with the Alliance’s enlargement to include 
former Warsaw Pact countries, thereby extending the NATO footprint in Europe.11 This 
enlargement to the east, he argued, had negative effects on then-prospective NATO 
members such as Romania by complicating their pursuit of EU membership.12 He 
maintained that the European Union (EU) should be more active in Central and Eastern 
Europe to better serve the interests of the states concerned.13 One example provided was 
                                                 
10 Ibid, 19. 
11 Meyer, “Carcass of Dead Policies,” 84. 
12 Ibid., 91. 
13 Ibid., 89. 
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Romania’s support of U.S. policy against terrorism during the George W. Bush 
administration as a way to gain favor with the United States and NATO. This split 
loyalty, Meyer argued, strained Romanian–EU political relations, thus serving as an 
example of how NATO affiliations and priorities can create conflict between member 
states and the other institutions they belong to or seek membership in.14  
Meyer also argued that the Membership Action Plan (MAP) after 9/11 became 
less about Alliance candidates fulfilling requirements and more about how those 
candidates aligned with U.S. policy and interests, thus undermining the entire program.15 
Meyer’s argument in this respect was not a criticism of enlargement, however, but an 
objection to how it was pursued in the years immediately after 9/11. Overall, Meyer 
viewed NATO as an organization that had overstepped its bounds in situations in which 
other international organizations would have been more appropriate instruments to take 
action. Indeed, Meyer advocated that the European Allies withdraw from the Alliance, 
putting an end to NATO. Meyer’s criticism of the Alliance extends beyond enlargement 
in that he calls for terminating NATO. 
Another critic of NATO enlargement is Dan Reiter. His argument is that the EU 
should push for democracy in Europe, not NATO, because the EU is less likely to 
provoke Russia. Reiter explains his perspective by laying out his interpretation of the 
contending schools of thought on the enlargement question. He holds that supporters of 
enlargement feel that the accession of former Warsaw Pact states would deter Russian 
aggression. He also believes that enlargement would reduce the potential for conflict 
between Alliance members, based on the commonly accepted theory that democracies are 
less likely to fight each other than are dictatorships. According to Reiter, the other side of 
the enlargement argument holds that enlargement threatens and therefore provokes 
Russia while also complicating internal Alliance decision making, which weakens 
NATO. Reiter also believes that NATO enlargement into former Communist states did 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 91. 
15 Meyer, “Carcass of Dead Policies,” 92. 
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not foster democracy. This is based on the fact that, according to the 1995 Study on 
NATO Enlargement, in order to be a NATO member a state must be a democracy. He 
cites the 1999 accessions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as examples of 
states that developed functioning democracies on their own. He observed that Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all had constitutional democracies 
established following the end of the Cold War without membership in NATO.16 He 
belittles the contributions to democratization of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.17 Overall 
his argument is that the enlargement of the Alliance is not effective at spreading 
democracy and that further enlargement should be discouraged. In short, Reiter is among 
the commentators opposing future NATO enlargement. 
The value of enlargement through small states for collective defense was disputed 
by Daalder, who wrote in 1999 that “an expansion of NATO’s purpose and membership 
risks not only increased dissension among the allies but also dissipation of the Atlantic 
Alliance’s ability to meet its fundamental collective defense tasks.”18 He cited the Baltic 
states as examples of limited military contributions: “Given Moscow’s predictable 
reaction and the fact that the Baltic states have little to contribute militarily to NATO, it 
is difficult to see how their inclusion in the Alliance meets the oft-repeated test for all 
new members, namely that ‘their accession to NATO will contribute to wider European 
stability and security.’”19 In these examples, with Daalder’s statement that “the Baltic 
states have little to contribute militarily to NATO,” he implies that small states mostly 
consume security while providing limited security capabilities for the Alliance.20 He 
argued that in future enlargement efforts the credibility of the enlargement process should 
be maintained so that friendly and hostile nations understand the open-door policy, which 
                                                 
16 Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,” International Security 25, 
no. 4 (2001): 65. 
17 Ibid., 61. 
18 Daalder, “NATO in the 21st Century,” 11. 
19 Ibid., 59. 
20 Ibid. 
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is to offer membership to prospective Allies, bringing them under the protection of all 
NATO members.21 
3. Enlargement—Pros 
The “pro” side of the enlargement discussion focuses primarily on promoting 
European stability both politically and militarily. Alexandra Gheciu supports NATO 
enlargement, particularly through the inclusion of small states. She argues that the 
previous inclusion of former Soviet states and satellites resulted in stronger 
democratization and better political relations among those states. She specifically cites 
the Czech Republic as an example of a small state in a geographically important location, 
which is able to support NATO efforts to counter Russian influence. Gheciu also relies 
on the theory that democracies generally do not fight each other as evidence for her 
argument for stability. In general, she believes a larger NATO means a bigger security 
framework for those within.22 This applies particularly to small states and demonstrates 
their role in collective defense and cooperative security.  
Another scholar, the late Ronald D. Asmus, also supported enlargement, but as a 
means to keep the Alliance from becoming politically and militarily weak. He wrote that 
NATO should, to avoid this weakening, focus more on military missions and be open to 
non-Article 5 operations outside of the territories of member states. Additionally, he 
argued that the Alliance should be the first choice among international institutions, when 
needed, as a means to promote positive relations among the Allies.23 Asmus held that 
continued enlargement and strengthening of NATO would be in the best interest of the 
Alliance and its neighbors.24 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 60. 
22 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International Socialization After 
the Cold War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 133. 
23 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 278–279. 
24 Ibid. 
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To repeat, Asmus was one of the supporters of enlargement, specifically through 
small state accessions. In his view, the Bosnian conflict highlighted the need for a post–
Cold War change in NATO. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia 
showed the potential for small states to contribute to operations conducted by the 
Alliance. One-sixth of the 60,000 troops deployed in 1996 came from non-NATO 
countries, most of them involved with the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP).25 
Asmus pointed out that Hungary was a contributor through its strategic position, which 
provided an ideal base of operations for the Alliance.26 NATO enlargement occurred in 
Eastern and Central Europe following this conflict, and Asmus held that this enlargement 
contributed to regional stability through the spread of democracy.27 In his view, events 
during this period demonstrated the value of enlargement, particularly including small 
states. 
Current instability in Eastern Europe, specifically in the Balkans, has led to calls 
for experts to devise a solution. Dessie Zagorcheva believes that the answer to stability in 
the Balkans is the enlargement of NATO through the inclusion of all the states in the 
region. She cites Russia’s support for Serbia on the subject of Kosovo’s status as a reason 
for NATO to increase its influence in the Balkans, thereby limiting Russian influence in 
this part of Europe.28 She goes on to state that Montenegro’s split from Serbia and its 
move toward NATO membership increased NATO influence in the region.29 As Asmus 
demonstrated, small states have the ability to contribute to the stability desired in Europe. 
Zagorcheva believes that instability threatens the region and greater Europe.30 She points 
out that enlargement is needed due to the many issues in the Western Balkan states, such 
as their “persistent state weakness, instability, nationalistic rhetoric, inter-ethnic tensions, 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 125. 
26 Ibid., 128. 
27 Ibid., 125. 
28 Dessie Zagorcheva, “NATO Enlargement and Security in the Balkans,” Journal of Regional 
Security 7, no. 1 (2012): 22. 
29 Ibid., 9. 
30 Zagorcheva, “NATO Enlargement and Security in the Balkans,” 8. 
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economic backwardness, territorial and border disputes, corruption, [and the] absence of 
the rule of law.”31 Despite the many individual problems faced by Balkan countries, she 
believes that the possibility of membership could serve as a motivation for reform in 
these nations as it has in many other Central and Eastern European countries.32 The 
Congressional Budget Office reported that “economic assistance [from NATO] to Central 
and Eastern Europe may have helped smooth the transition from Communism to market 
democracy.”33 
In the debate as to whether small states are security providers or consumers as 
NATO enlarges, Ramunas Vilpisauskas in 2002 viewed small states as potential security 
providers. He used the then-prospective inclusion of Lithuania as an example of this 
based on its expenditures on defense as a percentage of GDP, its participation in 
international security and peacekeeping operations, and its activities to support regional 
security in cooperation with NATO in various exercises.34 Vilpisauskas concluded his 
argument by stating that Lithuania as a NATO member would contribute to “creating a 
zone of peace, security, and prosperity.”35 Finally, he dismissed the argument that small 
states are “free riders” and mere consumers of security. He held that these are 
unsubstantiated fears.36 
Another scholar, Joel Hillison, agreed in 2009 with Vilpisauskas and found that 
the new states in the Alliance contributed on average more than the old states did based 
on their defense spending as a percentage of their GDP.37 Some commentators argue 
against enlargement because they believe that new states will not pull their weight, but 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 Congressional Budget Office, “NATO Burdensharing After Enlargement,” 15. 
34 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, “Lithuania’s Accession to NATO: Can a Small State Play the Role of a 
Security Provider?,” NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, 2002, 21–23. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Joel R. Hillison, New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2009), vii.  
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Hillison’s findings refuted this argument. He found that the limited troop contributions 
often provided to operations and exercises by small states, a common point made by 
those against enlargement, is not reflective of their willingness to participate, but rather a 
NATO military compatibility issue that will be resolved over time.38 Hillison, along with 
scholars such as Asmus and Gheciu, concluded that small states are beneficial in the 
enlargement of NATO and that the future of NATO depends on efforts by all the Allies—
old and new, large and small. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Every time NATO increases its membership, there is a discussion among experts 
and officials in the Alliance about whether enlargement is advantageous. The scrutiny has 
become more focused because the past several accessions to the Alliance have involved 
small states. To bring clarity to this debate, this thesis investigates their significance and 
value to NATO. Specifically, to this end, the thesis examines Albania’s performance and 
actions in the Alliance since its accession in 2009. The evidence provided is based on the 
current objectives and core tasks of NATO and the actions that Albania has taken in 
support of these objectives and core tasks. 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that Albania is a productive contributor to 
the efforts and objectives of NATO. A case study of Albania’s contributions may support 
the judgement that small states in the Alliance can fill important niche roles in support of 
NATO’s overall mission success. Attributes such as geographic location, regional 
knowledge and relationships, and specialized skills can be significant benefits to the 
Alliance and serve as vital assets that support the capabilities of larger and more powerful 
allies.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
An assessment of the contributions of small states in NATO is not most 
effectively accomplished through statistical data, but rather through analyzing individual 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
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examples of performance. This thesis examines the single case study of Albania. The 
case study assesses the performance of Albania based on its efforts in regional stability, 
actions in the global fight against terrorism, defense spending, and overall participation in 
and support of NATO activities. While only some of these actions are quantifiable, 
collectively they throw light on the extent to which Albania is a productive member of 
the Alliance. 
The sources and materials for this research include Albanian governmental 
documents, official NATO documents and reports, and scholarly literature analyzing 
Albanian actions. The research on Albania in particular dates for the most part from the 
end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 to 2016 to better show the country’s NATO-related 
activities, including Albania’s participation in Partnership for Peace and its fulfillment of 
the Membership Action Plan. Also, the research includes relevant background and 
current information describing the history, missions, and objectives of NATO. This thesis 
clarifies the expectations and objectives of the Alliance and shows how small states can 
fill important roles.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a brief history and 
overview of NATO and its objectives. Chapter III describes the modern history of 
Albania from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918–1922 to the present. This history 
throws light on the experiences and motivations of the Albanian people as well as 
outlining the evolving relationship between Albania and the West. The thesis then 
examines Albania’s post–Cold War ties to NATO, including Partnership for Peace, 
ultimately resulting in its membership in the Alliance in 2009, along with Croatia. 
Chapter IV analyzes Albania’s actions as an Alliance member through its defense 
spending, force modernization, exercises, and operations in support of NATO’s core 
tasks of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. Chapter V, the 
conclusion, presents findings as to what extent the hypothesis is supported by the 
evidence provided. The conclusion also explores the implications of the Albanian case 
study for small states that are current or aspiring members of the Alliance. The 
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organization of this thesis is designed to provide background about both Albania and 















The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political and military 
alliance composed of 28 member states that represent most of North America and 
Europe. NATO, a large organization comprised of variously sized states that provide 
assistance on a global scale, is designed to promote democracy while collectively 
supporting its core tasks of crisis management, cooperative security, and collective 
defense. This chapter presents a brief history of NATO from its founding to the present 
day. It examines the North Atlantic Treaty that governs the Alliance, and describes the 
functions and expectations of members, including small states, within the Alliance. 
NATO was created in 1949 for the purposes of “deterring Soviet expansionism, 
forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North 
American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.”39 
As the American Marshall Plan provided economic aid to Western Europe during its 
recovery after World War II, the Soviet threat was also felt in Europe, and affected 
nations needed guaranteed security during their rebuilding processes.40 As Lawrence 
Kaplan observed, “Only an American guarantee could serve this purpose.”41  
Tensions remained high between NATO and the Soviet Union throughout the 
Cold War, with periods of détente. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany 
was reunified and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, signaling the effective end of the Cold War 
and the rapid decline of Communism in Europe. Several former Soviet republics and 
Warsaw Pact members began to gravitate toward NATO. These interested countries 
undertook significant social and political reforms to establish governments more aligned 
with democratic principles. This transition continues more than 25 years later, as 
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demonstrated in 2009 with the Albanian and Croatian accessions to NATO, and also in 
2015–2016 with Montenegro’s “Invitee Status” in the Alliance,42 which allows its 
representatives to participate as observers in Allied meetings.43 
Since the fall of Soviet Communism, NATO has been involved in a wide range of 
activities encompassing its core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and 
cooperative security. For example, in 1995, NATO engaged in an air campaign in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Operation Deliberate Force) after the failure of diplomatic efforts to 
facilitate the region’s reconstruction. This air campaign made possible the Dayton Peace 
Agreement ending the 1992–1995 war.44 This operation marked a new stage for the 
Alliance, showing that it was willing to act militarily in support of collective security 
objectives if needed. The largest demonstration of military force by NATO Allies 
occurred between 2001 and 2014, in support of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) deployed in Afghanistan, which is also considered to be among NATO’s 
most significant crisis management operations to date. NATO Allies led ISAF from 
December 2001 to August 2003, when the Alliance took command of ISAF. 
Outside of combat operations, NATO has been involved with several 
humanitarian missions, including the provision of support to affected areas in 2005: in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which resulted in between 1,200 and 1,800 deaths and 
the displacement of more than 400,000 people from the New Orleans area and the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast, and following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, which killed an 
estimated 53,000 Pakistanis and injured an additional 75,000.45 In and outside the North 
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Atlantic region, the Alliance fulfills its core tasks. NATO continues to stand ready to 
“safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military 
means,”46 and it does so by ensuring that all members of the Alliance respect the North 
Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to respect the treaty was a significant adjustment for 
many states, including the United States, where it sparked controversy among 
isolationists.47 Member nations had to operate in consideration of each other’s needs, not 
just their own. As they agreed to protect one another, entering the Alliance meant a 
retooling of policy for member states large and small.  
A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY  
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with 
all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They 
seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They 
are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the 
preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
—Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty48 
The North Atlantic Treaty is the founding and principal guiding document of 
NATO and all member states in the Alliance. The fundamental reason behind the treaty 
was to form a group of nations that agreed to defend one another in the event of an 
external threat. The treaty is also an agreement of peace and cooperation between the 
members of the Alliance. The 14 articles of the treaty describe its purpose and the 
expectations of the members, as well as how these are to be implemented. It is concise, 
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and most of the articles are only one to two sentences long. The longest, Article 14, is just 
five sentences.  
The two articles that shape the treaty and the Alliance are Articles 2 and 5. Article 
2 sets out the non-violent means with which the Alliance wishes to operate through the 
strengthening of institutions to bring about peace, stability, and economic collaboration 
among the member states. In the words of Article 2, 
[t]he Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful 
and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, 
by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which 
these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability 
and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international 
economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between 
any or all of them.49 
It is important to note that Article 2 forms the basis of NATO’s political aspect, 
which goes largely unsung in most analyses. There is considerable political importance to 
the Alliance, and its practices and premises begin with Article 2. 
Article 5 assures that members of the Alliance will be protected by each other as 
if it were one organic body under the principle of collective defense. To quote Article 5,  
[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result 
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.50 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 “The North Atlantic Treaty.” 
 19
Article 5 is the crux of the military side of the Alliance. It states in strong terms 
the commitment of the Allies to mutual aid in countering aggression.  
The North Atlantic Treaty guides the decisions of the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC), “the principal decision-making body within NATO.”51 The North Atlantic 
Council was established under Article 9 of the treaty, and its “decisions are agreed upon 
on the basis of unanimity and common accord.”52 The council is comprised of 
representatives from each member country, and all members “have an equal right to 
express their views and share in the consensus on which decisions are based.”53 Their 
collective decisions shape the current operations and the future of the Alliance. These 
decisions include the shaping of the organization’s core tasks as outlined in NATO’s 
2010 Strategic Concept.  
The Strategic Concept is a document that aids in focusing the Alliance’s efforts 
while fulfilling the intent of the treaty. Specifically, it “outlines NATO’s enduring 
purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks.”54 Within this document are the 
core tasks of the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative 
security.55 As agreed upon by the NAC, crisis management focuses on prevention as well 
as the handling of crises that arise and affect various areas across the world. Cooperative 
security “focuses on promoting international security through cooperation.”56 The final 
core task, collective defense, centers on the deterrence of aggression from threats and the 
defense of NATO members from those threats. Each of these tasks requires dedicated 
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resources and commitment by Alliance members. The diversity among members enables 
the fulfillment of a wide range of needs.  
B. CORE TASKS 
Collective defense stands out as the primary purpose of NATO, beginning with 
the treaty and continuing as one of three core tasks of the Strategic Concept. Each 
member state has taken a vow to defend the other states from threats, and this brings 
collective strength to the Alliance. The security environment shifts as threats change. The 
9/11 terrorist attack remains the only time that the Article 5 commitment to collective 
defense has been invoked.57 Despite its limited history of use, it is the umbrella of 
protection over the Alliance. Article 5 contributes to the Alliance’s deterrence posture 
every day. 
Crisis management is a core task that has been exercised frequently since the 
early 1990s, with noteworthy beginnings in the Balkans. One specific case occurred in 
Albania, beginning in 1997 during a period of significant domestic turmoil. In August 
1997, a NATO team traveled to the country to assist in repairing Albania’s police system, 
banking institutions, and economic condition.58 As Albania continued to face problems 
internally and externally, it again reached out to NATO in March 1998. Due to security 
concerns over conflicts in Kosovo, Albania “became the first Partner to exercise its PfP 
[Partnership for Peace] emergency consultation rights.”59 The assistance that Albania 
received included aid for ethnic Albanian refugees fleeing Serbian repression in Kosovo, 
military training, and military supply assistance. In order to help Albania, NATO handled 
the crisis carefully, reaching out in support of Tirana and ethnic Albanian refugees while 
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simultaneously attempting to not provoke the Serbian leadership.60 These calculated 
efforts are crucial to properly carrying out the core task of crisis management.  
Cooperative security is the last of the core tasks. It is pursued in part through 
Alliance enlargement, which is included as a part of cooperative security in the Strategic 
Concept.61 Enlargement allows the Alliance to expand its activities into areas that were 
previously non-aligned or hostile. These extended activities encompass more locations in 
which to deploy military resources as needed in the face of potential threats. It should be 
noted that cooperative security involves efforts in addition to the NATO enlargement 
process. These other activities include working with international organizations and 
pursuing arms control agreements.  
The Balkans offers examples of how Alliance boundaries have changed. Albania 
was one of the original members of the Warsaw Pact, and its Alliance affiliation with 
Partnership for Peace did not begin until after the Cold War had ended. Albania’s PfP 
affiliation provided NATO with a friendly Balkan state as a partner, and ultimately as an 
ally since 2009. Under the cooperative security core task, NATO continues to welcome 
new members and partners to enhance security in the face of global threats. To avoid 
problematic confrontations, the Allies take care when establishing each new relationship. 
According to NATO’s website, “CS [cooperative security] can only succeed if all 
partners speak the same language and the right balance between investment and benefit is 
found. CS as a double-edged sword requires NATO and its partners to find this balance 
and use the sharpness of this weapon to diminish the security challenges.”62 
Bringing new members into the Alliance is achieved by using instruments such as 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP). These tools help 
put prospective members on the right course to meet the requirements needed for 
accession. MAP, for example, was used and continues to be used “to encourage and 
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support liberal democratic reforms” in the Western Balkans.63 PfP, established in 1994, 
contributes to development prospects by allowing potential members to participate in 
Alliance activities and exercises. PfP members also choose individual national goals to 
pursue with NATO as part of their participation.64 This program is a sort of practice for 
prospective members as they undertake political, military, and domestic reforms to better 
align their systems with NATO ideals. NATO benefits from the program in several ways. 
These countries contribute to the overall security landscape and NATO gets their support 
in the pursuit of shared objectives without a legal obligation to defend them. NATO’s 
collective defense obligation only applies to members. In theory, this means that PfP 
countries are on their own in the event of an attack. The Alliance might nonetheless still 
come to the defense of a PfP participant, as political and security considerations could 
lead the NAC to act in its defense. While collective defense support is only guaranteed to 
Alliance members, the Alliance’s principles indicate that NATO Allies might in some 
cases still come to the aid of a partner. The Allies chose, however, not to act in defense of 
two PfP partners: Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. 
C. PARTNER TO MEMBER  
Since the Cold War, many former Warsaw Pact members have become Alliance 
members. This demonstrates how much the security environment has changed over the 
past several decades. Each additional member brings a different perspective and a unique 
set of abilities. The variety of abilities is important for the execution of the core tasks, as 
the tasks often blend into or complement one another. Collective defense, for example, is 
in principle made stronger by cooperative security, which seeks to enlarge the Alliance. 
Crisis management also plays a role in overall Alliance security, as its purpose is to 
prevent and mitigate the effects of crises early on.65 Large and small Allies are both able 
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to contribute to security through their particular sets of capabilities. The core tasks 
provide a structured framework for NATO and individual members to focus their efforts.  
As of 2016, there have been six rounds of enlargement within the Alliance, 
resulting in its growth from 12 to 28 countries. Currently, the countries actively seeking 
membership include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine,66 while 
the last round of enlargement in 2009 saw the addition of Albania and Croatia.67 The 
strengthening of NATO ties and influence in the Balkan region is evident in the case of 
Montenegro, for which NATO Foreign Ministers signed the Accession Protocol on May 
19, 2016, poising it to become the Alliance’s next member. According to Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg, the admission of Montenegro is “a clear sign that NATO’s door 
remains open for partners that share and promote our values.”68 
Maintaining the “open door policy” is important for attracting new members and 
partners to the Alliance. However, in addition to the benefits that new members bring in 
terms of capabilities, these new Allies may also signify additional risks and 
responsibilities. The majority of the states that have been added since the establishment 
of the Alliance were formerly under Soviet or Communist influence. According to 
Alexandra Gheciu of Canada’s Centre for International Policy Studies, “[i]t was argued 
that domestic instability along with problems of transition to post-Communist institutions 
threatened to be one of the key—if not the key—sources of instability in Europe.”69  
This issue in Eastern and Central Europe is different from the situation in the 
West. After the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe was left with institutions that 
revolved around a principle of dictatorial one-party governments ultimately controlled by 
Moscow. The fall of Communism left a vacuum in these countries that required the 
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retooling and often the complete rebuilding of institutions to better align these states with 
the democratic values of the West. This adjustment was necessary to aid in their 
integration in Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union. In other 
words, the adjustment fostered cooperation with the democratic Western states—both 
politically and economically.  
The Alliance seeks to strengthen democratic institutions among its current 
members and potential members. In former Communist states, NATO helps to build 
institutions that are suitable to the Alliance and the West from the ground up.70 The 
problems inherent to this process are reflected in the Czech Republic’s transition. For 
example, as Gheciu notes, Czech decision makers “did not know how to rule the military 
except in a rigid, Soviet-style, top-down way.”71 The Alliance’s efforts to overcome these 
practices are important when facing the issues that come with prospective new members. 
Successfully aiding them during their transitions captures the strength of new members 
while simultaneously reducing risks.  
The PfP program and MAP are key aspects to the process prior to accession. The 
first chapter of each prospective member’s MAP “requires candidates to have stable 
democratic systems, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have 
good relations with their neighbors, show commitment to the rule of law and human 
rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market 
economy.”72 This program was successful in aiding seven accessions in 2004 and two 
more in 2009, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro are all currently 
following an active MAP. The success of the process is most clearly seen in Montenegro, 
which was offered the Accession Protocol for membership in May 2016.73 
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D. CONCLUSIONS  
Today, the Alliance relies on the 2010 Strategic Concept and the core tasks 
specified in that document to guide its focus. Although collective defense is still NATO’s 
fundamental purpose, day-to-day operations involve the other core tasks more 
prominently. New and ongoing crises that threaten the security of members and partners 
call for the attention of NATO. The Alliance is able and willing to engage in areas from 
Afghanistan to Kosovo. Furthermore, the addition of new members and partners 
continually changes the territory and responsibilities of the Alliance, while 
simultaneously increasing its capabilities. As NATO grows, its new members contribute 
vital regional and cultural knowledge along with potential strategic locations and 
capabilities.  
All of these new capabilities could be useful for future operations. Small and 
economically weak states such as Albania provide local knowledge and a regional 
footprint to serve the Alliance if and when needed. Even such seemingly small 
contributions could be important in a crisis or combat situation in the region. Yet, aside 
from the benefits of enlargement, this growth brings new challenges and increased 
responsibilities. The NAC is left with the charge to ensure that the Alliance moves in the 
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III. ALBANIAN MODERN HISTORY THROUGH 
THE COLD WAR 
Albania is a country little known to much of the world, but it has a rich and 
complicated history of military engagements. It endured a multitude of invasions, notably 
by the Greeks, the Turks, and the Italians. Intertwined with its military history is an 
equally eclectic social history embodied in a well-known Albanian saying, “Where the 
sword is, there lies religion.”74 The modern country of Albania is just over 100 years old, 
but the ethnic Albanian people trace their history back more than 2,000 years. Scholars 
generally agree that the original people living in modern Albanian territories were tribes 
speaking the Illyrian language as early as the seventh century BC. Ethnic Albanians have 
maintained an identity to the present day despite the various wars and occupations they 
have endured as a people.  
This chapter offers an overview of the history of the Albanians and then focuses 
on the nation’s modern history from 1912 to 2009. This time period includes Albania’s 
independence, its involvement with World War I and World War II, the rise and fall of 
Communism, and its transition to democracy, including its Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
membership.  
A. INDEPENDENCE AND THE WORLD WARS 
Albania’s modern history as a nation began when it declared its independence in 
1912, an effort of self-preservation during the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire 
after nearly 500 years of Ottoman occupation.75  
The immediate concern was linguistic. At the end of the 19th century, the 
Albanians had decided that they needed to take action to preserve their language. They 
adopted one common alphabet on November 14, 1908; this Latin-based alphabet remains 
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Albania’s official script today. It was believed to be the best choice to unite the Muslim, 
Christian, Gheg, and Tosk people in the region, all of whom shared a common heritage.76 
This unity through the written language was an important step as the diverse but unified 
people moved forward toward establishing an Albanian state. This demonstrated a focus 
on nationalism as an independent state was being defined.  
The state’s independence was officially confirmed after the Ottomans gave up 
their claims in May 1913. The great powers recognized Albania as an independent state 
through the Treaty of London on May 30, 1913.77 Albania was a principality until 1925, 
a republic until 1928, a monarchy until 1939, under Italian control until the end of World 
War II, and then a socialist republic under the dictator Enver Hoxha. This period of 
rotating government types was tumultuous. Along with the changing of government 
types, not all of the people accepted the institutions of the state.78 For example, early on 
the people in the north of Albania resisted following the authority of the new national 
leadership after the 1913 Treaty of London was signed, as many of them chose to follow 
their clan chiefs rather than the national government.79  
Although Albania had gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the 
newly established state experienced several iterations of territorial change in conjunction 
with the multiple changes in government. The main reason for this turmoil was its 
location in the notoriously unstable Balkans, which was at a crossroads of interest from 
multiple nations. Italy’s interest in the region was particularly strong between World War 
I and World War II. Albania has a coastline on the Adriatic Sea—just at its choke point 
leading to the Mediterranean Sea. The region is also a passageway to the rest of Eastern 
Europe and Asia. To the south lies Greece, which has historical claims to parts of 
southern Albania. In the first half of the 20th century, the Greeks routinely took military 
and political actions to renew their claims to the southern lands of Albania. To the north, 
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Montenegro and Serbia (at times part of the combined state of Yugoslavia) continually 
pushed into Albania in a furtherance of the long-standing battle over the lands making up 
modern Albania. In 1912, following World War I, the lands of Albania were controlled 
by Greece, Italy, Montenegro, and Serbia.80 These foreign interventions in Albania 
forced it to abdicate domestic control in some episodes and to make alliances as the 
international security environment changed in an effort to maintain Albanian sovereignty. 
Italian control was the most prominent factor in Albania after World War I as the 
Italians exerted their influence in varying degrees of severity ranging from full 
occupation to the appearance of equal cooperation. This cooperation was highly visible 
when Italy supported the establishment of the Albanian monarchy with the introduction 
of King Zog I, known as the “King of the Albanians,” on September 1, 1928.81 The reign 
of King Zog saw an increase in Italian control and influence within the country. It also 
piqued Adolf Hitler’s interest in the region and growing relationship with Italy. On the 
occasion of King Zog’s wedding in 1938, “a long, scarlet, supercharged Mercedes [was] 
sent by Adolf Hitler.”82 A year later, Mussolini invaded Albania, landing 40,000 troops 
on April 7, 1939.83 Hitler called Albania, in reference to this successful invasion and 
occupation, “a stronghold which will inexorably dominate the Balkans.”84 
Italy continued its control of Albania during World War II until Italy’s effective 
surrender to the Allies in an armistice made public on September 8, 1943. At this point, 
the war and the German strategy changed.85 Germany seamlessly continued the 
occupation of the Albanian territory after the fall of Italian control. Concurrently, the 
Albanian Communist Party (ACP), subsequently headed by Enver Hoxha, was founded 
and quickly grew in power and prominence as an opposition to the occupation. The 
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Germans also faced persistent Albanian armed resistance throughout the country. The 
resolve of the Albanians kept the Germans occupied as Allied forces planned and 
effected landings and attacks against the German forces.86 This trying period spurred a 
domestic movement that ultimately led Albania into Communism as the Germans 
weakened and World War II came to a close. A provisional Albanian government was set 
up on October 20, 1944, with Hoxha the prime minister and minister of defense.87 This 
development was the first step in stabilizing the country and a glimpse of what the next 
45 years would look like. 
B. THE COLD WAR 
With the ACP running the country it was only natural for Albania to seek an 
alliance with the largest Communist state in the region—the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, Hoxha became a strong authoritarian dictator who took whatever measures were 
necessary to ensure that his agenda was accomplished. Hoxha’s Albania cut off ties with 
the West and then cultivated and relied on relationships with Communist nations 
including the Soviet Union and China—beginning an age of isolationism behind the Iron 
Curtain. These isolationist practices were evident within European international 
organizations. For example, during this time Albania refused to participate in the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—not joining until June 1991 after the 
fall of European Communism.88  
Hoxha was a strong supporter of Stalin, and their relationship allowed a poor and 
backward Albania to begin to stabilize after many years of conflict. September 1948 
marked the beginning of formal Soviet support to Albania as a result of an agreement 
between Stalin and Hoxha. The Soviets agreed to buy “Albanian imports at doubled 
prices, and imports from the Soviet Union were delivered at half price.”89 Due to its 
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isolationist practices, such arrangements with the Soviets were vital for the economic 
welfare of Albania. This relationship between the nations was not always ideal as Soviet 
leaders changed, but it was functional.  
Along with subsidizing the Albanian economy, the Soviets also supported the 
Albanian military. This support meant that the borders of Albania remained intact and did 
not suffer numerous encroachments as experienced in the first half of the century. Early 
on, this Soviet support was seen as a threat to the West, which saw in Albania another 
example of an expanding Soviet behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet influence in Albania was 
different from that in other Communist states in Europe. Albania took a Stalinist 
approach to Communism and resisted the changes that began under Khrushchev, which 
were reflected in many Marxist–Leninist parties in other states. For example, Hoxha 
believed that the proletariat needed to be suppressed through a strict dictatorship until 
Communism was fully embraced and established.90 According to Stephen Bowers, 
“Hoxha rejected the notion that the ‘state of the whole people’ was a direct and 
appropriate evolution from the dictatorship of the proletariat.”91  
To challenge this wave of Communism, a U.S. CIA operation was initiated under 
President Truman with the aim of overthrowing the Communist Albanian leader Enver 
Hoxha and replacing him with Zog, the former Albanian king, who had left Albania 
during the 1939 Italian invasion.92 The operation consisted of a two-pronged approach 
that involved propaganda transmitted via radio broadcasts, newspaper prints, and leaflet 
drops to stimulate political unrest. The other approach was through the recruiting, 
training, and equipping of a guerrilla force designed to infiltrate Albania and to stimulate 
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unrest, culminating in a coup d’état.93 Both of these approaches were executed 
simultaneously throughout the operational phase that began in the fall of 1950. The 
domestic newspaper Shqiperia was used to promote an Albania without Hoxha, and it 
attempted to garner support from Albanians within the country and those living 
throughout the world.94  
The problem with written propaganda was that 80 percent of the nation was 
illiterate.95 On September 18, 1951, radio messages broadcast from Greece sent the same 
message as the newspaper, but once again the effectiveness was limited due to the small 
number of homes with electricity and radios.96 After several attempts with propaganda 
and the infiltration of agents and guerrilla forces on the ground, the operation saw its end 
as a result of the Albanian authorities announcing in 1954 that they “had conducted a 
massive deception operation against the CIA by forcing captured radio operators to 
transmit false information.”97 This was a clear sign that the operation had been 
compromised and that further effort by the CIA was futile.  
The takeaway from the CIA operation in Albania was that the Soviet influence 
was strong among Eastern European states. This influence was enough for a small 
satellite state to stay loyal despite years of direct Western attempts to exert influence. 
Following the CIA operation, the bilateral Albanian–Soviet alliance became formalized 
on a multilateral basis through the Warsaw Pact, of which Albania was among the 
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founding members in 1955.98 This alliance and its commitment to Communism 
inherently placed Albania in direct opposition with NATO for decades to follow. 
The relationship between Albania and the Soviet Union began to experience 
complications following Stalin’s death in 1953.99 Albania’s trust in the Soviets was not 
absolute, and this situation led Hoxha to seek new, stronger ties with another powerful 
Communist state—China. This shift was not a complete move away from the Soviets, but 
it was a maneuver that let Moscow know that Albania was able to make its own decisions 
and that it was not its puppet. It was also a message to express Albania’s dissatisfaction 
with Nikita Khrushchev’s strengthened ties with Yugoslavia. Indeed, Hoxha objected to 
all such softening from the Kremlin, and “by 1958 Albania stood with China in opposing 
Moscow on issues of peaceful coexistence, de-Stalinization, and Yugoslavia’s ‘separate 
road to socialism’”—issues contributing to the Sino–Soviet split.100 The Albanian 
support for China was publicly displayed in 1960 at the Moscow conference of 
Communist states when Albania backed China’s criticism of Soviet leaders.101 In 
October 1960, at the National Day of the People’s Republic of China, a top Albanian 
official, Deputy Premier Abdyl Kellezi, praised the Chinese and Mao Zedong.102 This 
shift in support by Albania was bold, but it allowed Tirana to continue to pursue the 
interests of the state while securing support from a strong ally.  
Tensions between Hoxha and Khrushchev continued for years. For example, during 
a meeting between the Albanian Labor Party Delegation and the Soviet Union Communist 
Party leadership on November 12, 1960. During the meeting, Hoxha and Khrushchev had a 
tense exchange over the condition of their states’ relationship. During the meeting, Hoxha 
                                                 
98 Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle?: An Inside History of the Warsaw 
Pact, 1955-1991, National Security Archive Cold War Readers (New York: Central European University 
Press, 2005), 1–3. 
99 Vickers, The Albanians, 172. 
100 “Albania—Albania and China,” Country Data, accessed July 29, 2016, http://www.country-
data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-169.html. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ana Lalaj, Christian F. Osterman, and Ryan Gage, “‘Albania Is Not Cuba.’ Sino-Albanian 
Summits and the Sino-Soviet Splits,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 16 (n.d.): 184. 
 34
continually raised his voice when addressing Khrushchev and others. In response to this 
behavior, Khrushchev simply kept asking him to lower his voice. Hoxha carried himself as 
a passionate and forceful person in general and this meeting was no different. 
Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with Hoxha’s behavior was reflected in several statements he 
made to Hoxha, including, “but you spit on me” and “you have no respect for me.”103 
Concluding this meeting, as Hoxha and his party stood to exit, a member of Hoxha’s 
delegation had the final word: “You should know, Comrade Khrushchev, that Albania will 
always remain faithful to the Soviet Union and be a member of the socialist camp.”104 This 
closing comment reassured the Soviets that Albania was still a committed ally despite the 
current disagreements between the two states.  
Albania continued its alliance with the Soviets but on multiple occasions made 
bold demands and requests. For example, Vojtech Mastny wrote,  
The [Albanian] message spelled out extravagant conditions the Albanians 
wanted to be met before they would agree to resume participation in the 
alliance. They included not only restitution of all the damage the Soviet 
Union had purportedly inflicted on them but also abrogation of the 1963 
nuclear test ban treaty and, for good measure, the provision of all the 
Warsaw Pact member-states with nuclear weapons.105 
Such demands further emboldened the Albanians. The most important message that was 
maintained by Albania to Moscow is that Albania would not be easily controlled or 
persuaded. 
During the years of the Cold War, Albania moved to and from whichever side of 
an alliance or affiliation would best ensure its sovereignty, forming various, often 
competing, partnerships with the Soviet Union and China. The entire basis of these 
alliances was a determination to keep Albania independent.  
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The death of Hoxha on April 11, 1985, was a significant turning point in the 
potency of the Communist party in Albania.106 The longstanding dictator was gone and 
knowledge of his poor practices become more public. The shifting of alliances that 
Hoxha was known for racked up a tremendous amount of debt due to the subsidies 
received from allies such as China. The new Albanian leadership was left with an 
impoverished economy in addition to strained international relationships.107 Hoxha’s 
successor, Ramiz Alia, struggled to keep the citizens calm in Albania. The economic 
conditions impacted nearly everyone as food of all sorts began to be rationed. This forced 
Alia to reach out to the West for help. Germany was the first to give developmental aid in 
1987, followed by France and Italy.108 This was in direct conflict with the ideology of his 
mentor and predecessor—Enver Hoxha. 
Further signs of a declining ideological reign were seen on the campus of what was 
then still called the Enver Hoxha University of Tirana. Students began wearing blue jeans, 
leather jackets, and T-shirts with rock bands on them such as U-2. People began to modify 
their antennas so that they could view Italian television while the radio station in Tirana 
began playing Western music. All of this continued through the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, which the Albanian leadership attempted to dismiss and downplay to its citizens 
despite the influx of Western influence and an apparent breaking down of Communism.109 
As the strength and influence of Communism started to collapse in the Soviet 
empire, so did Albania’s reliance on it. In 1992, Albania fully discarded Communism and 
became an official democracy, holding its first free and fair elections, which put Sali 
Berisha into power. This move to democracy started a new phase in Albania’s history, 
aligning the nation with the principal values of Western organizations such as the 
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European Union (EU) and NATO, which require democratic governments for all 
candidates to acquire membership in their organizations. 
C. POST–COLD WAR 
After the Cold War, Albania implemented massive reforms and opened the 
country to the West after decades of isolationism. The nation expressed interest in 
dialogue with NATO by becoming a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) in June 1992. Later that year, Albanian President Sali Berisha visited Brussels to 
meet with the NATO secretary general, an encounter that preceded the secretary 
general’s visit to Tirana. This all culminated in Albania’s membership in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994.110 This process of cooperation was another positive 
step toward membership in NATO. Through PfP, Albania learned about the values and 
objectives of NATO, as well as the expectations placed on member states. The nation 
took part in many operations that supported NATO’s core tasks, which are identified later 
in this chapter. Leading up to its entrance into NATO in 2009, Albania also undertook 
significant domestic, political, and military reforms. Albania’s military expenditures 
based on dollars spent and as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) are shown 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Albanian Military Expenditures from 2001 to 2012.111 
 
As shown in Table 1, there has been a steady increase in defense expenditures 
through Albania’s entrance into NATO in 2009. The NATO Allies have agreed that each 
member state should spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense, but few member states 
actually meet this goal.112 As of 2015, the median expenditure across all member states 
was only 1.18 percent.113 The United States and the United Kingdom are two of the five 
NATO states that spent 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense. Albania has 
historically been vigorous in military spending compared to other states of its size, as 
indicated in Table 1. It has a limited GDP, and its willingness to spend so much on 
defense is one of the ways in which the country demonstrated its dedication to the 
Alliance’s expectations as it sought membership.  
Another area in which Albania worked to improve was pursuing domestic and 
political reforms. After its initial elections and the establishment of democracy, Albania 
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experienced a major domestic crisis in 1997 as a result of financial mismanagement and 
corruption through pyramid schemes that involved elected leaders across the country. The 
pyramid schemes reached all economic levels within Albania. Life savings were lost as 
people “invested” their money in high-return investment ventures that later were found to 
be fraudulent. Millions of dollars were squandered away by elites and businessmen 
within the country. This caused the public to see “all their leaders as opportunistic 
elites.”114 The protests that followed resulted in advancing reforms throughout the 
country. The two biggest needs identified by NATO after 1997 were electoral and 
judicial reform. The Albanian Parliament responded by drafting legislation to address 
these issues and began working on an implementation plan prior to the 2009 accession to 
the Alliance.115 Correcting this type of behavior was at the core of PfP doctrine to 
ready Albania for Alliance membership.  
Partnership for Peace was viewed by Albania as a measure to intensify its 
relationship with the Alliance, while for Albania the ultimate purpose of joining NATO 
was to achieve security and stability in the Balkans and the Mediterranean region.116 
During Albania’s time in PfP, it worked diligently on internal reforms of its political and 
military systems while participating in several NATO operations alongside actual 
members. The nation’s efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan demonstrated its 
willingness to become a productive member of the Alliance, and all of these efforts 
resulted in Albania’s accession in 2009.117 The next chapter includes a discussion of 
Albania’s military contributions in these regions under PfP auspices, leading up to its 
current participation as a new Alliance member.  
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Albania’s history is one of survival and eventual independence. The people of 
Albania have ties to the lands of their country going back over 2,000 years. Over the 
course of history, they have fought to maintain their lands, culture, independence, and 
way of life. The modern state of Albania consists of people devoted to this effort. 
Throughout the 20th century, Albania was at the center of some of the biggest events and 
military occupations in history. It was either controlled by or allied with the Ottomans, 
the Soviets, fascist Italians, and Nazi Germans. Albania also completely rotated sides of 
the table in its relations with the United States—going from Warsaw Pact member to 
NATO member. Each of these powerful groups influenced Albania and functioned as 
building blocks (or as negative examples) leading to its present state. 
The purpose of this historical overview has been to provide insight into the 
mindset of the Albanian people, including its leadership. This understanding is vital in 
furnishing insight into what motivates the country and how that may influence its future 
foreign and domestic policies. This history shows Albania as a state committed to 
sovereignty, identity conservation, and cultural preservation. It has used several informal 
and formal alliances as a means to accomplish its goals—most recently NATO.  
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IV. ALBANIA’S ALLIANCE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM 
PARTNERSHIP TO MEMBERSHIP 
Albania is one of the newest members in NATO, and its Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) membership (1994–2009) coupled now with its seven years of Alliance 
membership activities serve as a single case study of how a small state can function as a 
security provider in the Alliance. Since gaining membership in NATO in 2009, Albania 
has continued its reforms and the participation in Alliance activities that it initiated as a 
PfP member.  
This chapter outlines how Albania has performed in the Alliance through its 
economic policies, military modernization, and participation in NATO’s core tasks of 
collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. The results of these 
actions illustrate the advantages and costs of Albania’s membership in NATO. These 
impacts on NATO by Albania serve as an example of how small states affect the 
Alliance, thus acting as a reference for the Alliance when considering future enlargement 
decisions. The Allies cannot, of course, generalize about all small state members of the 
Alliance from a single case. Albania’s performance as an ally nonetheless raises and 
answers questions of fundamental importance for NATO’s future. Albania demonstrates 
that a small ally can make significant contributions.  
A. ECONOMICS  
Economics is a driving or limiting factor in nearly all of the functions of a 
government. This section examines the Albanian economy at two different levels—macro 
and micro. At the macro level, the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) is examined 
over several years, and at the micro level, the salaries of Albanian workers and military 
members are identified. The amount of GDP does not necessarily mean an economy is 
poor, but a snapshot of several years can give clues to an economy’s performance. In the 
same respect, the level of wages in a country does not demonstrate an economy’s 
 42
performance, but a comparative look does give insight into potential domestic and 
derivative issues.118  
Currently in Albania there is a drastic wage gap between the rich and the poor that 
results in spending restraints and a limited individual cash flow for spending in general. 
The monthly salary range across the nation is between 160 and 9,000 euros, with an 
average salary of 406 euros. The hourly wage breaks down to approximately 1.8 euros 
per hour versus 6 to 8 euros per hour in other European countries.119 This gap in earning 
levels among workers demonstrates a polarized system consisting of a weak middle class. 
The low salaries of the average worker further reinforce this point, particularly when 
compared to other European countries.120  
The Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) pay is also very low, with a soldier’s pay at 
nearly half of the average worker’s pay in Albania. Some of the monthly salaries at 
various ranks are 222 euros for the lowest enlisted, 425 euros for the highest ranking non-
commissioned officers with 26 years of service, and 1,114 euros for a three-star general 
equivalent with 26 years of service.121 The weak condition of the middle class means that 
there is less money circulating within the country. The small size of Albania also means 
that it is required to look to international markets for many of its needs, driving up the 
cost of common items.  
The positive news concerning wages in the country is that since Albania joined 
the Alliance, it has experienced a steady increase in the average monthly salary of its 
workers, as shown in Table 2. The numbers to the left are Albanian lek, the national 
currency, and represent the monthly salary by year. The blue line represents the salary 
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changes as it increases. As shown in Table 2, in 2009 the average salary was equivalent 
to approximately 265 euros per month. The first quarter of 2016 saw a continued rise in 
the average salary and recorded an all-time high of approximately 400 euros per 
month.122 On a percentage basis this is a significant increase, which implies that there is 
promise of better pay in the future. Despite the change in pay over the past several years, 
overall Albania is still far behind many European nations.  
Table 2.   Albanian Salaries from 2006 to 2016123 
 
At the macro level, Albania is also falling behind every Alliance member in terms 
of real GDP. In 2015, its reported GDP was $13 billion. Iceland and Estonia, the nations 
closest to Albania, had GDPs of $15 and $23 billion, respectively. In terms of GDP per 
capita, Albania has the lowest reported numbers at $4,500 in GDP per person. Iceland 
and Estonia separated themselves in this measure, with $47,300 and $18,100 per capita, 
respectively. Albania is in essence the least prosperous Alliance member at both the 
national and individual level. This limited cash flow restricts what the nation can do. The 
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good news for Albania is that its annual GDP has continued to rise since its accession to 
NATO in 2009, just as the average salary for workers, as depicted in Table 3.124 
Table 3.   Albanian Real GDP from 2009 to 2016.125 
 
B. DEFENSE SPENDING AND LONG-TERM PLANNING 
Economically, Albania is clearly behind the rest of the Allies in its ability to 
generate revenue and pay its workers. Despite this weak economic position, Albania 
manages to outspend about half of the Alliance members in terms of military spending as 
a percentage of its GDP. For example, Canada, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all 
spent less than Albania as a percentage of their GDP as of July 2016. Since 2009, 
Albania’s expenditures as a percentage of GDP have decreased, as depicted in Table 4, 
but its rate of spending is still competitive among the Allies.126 Moreover, the amount of 
                                                 
124 “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016).” 
125 Adapted from Ibid.  
126 Ibid. 
 45
defense spending per capita in Albania has risen steadily since 2009 through 2016 from 
$3,900 to $4,700.127 
Table 4.   Albanian Defense Spending from 2009 to 2016128 
 
 
Albania demonstrates that a small and economically weak state can choose to 
outperform many stronger and richer Alliance members in terms of defense spending. 
Every year, all NATO members report their national GDPs along with the amount of 
amount of money they spent on defense. The consistent defense spending by small 
countries with weaker economies like Albania, in accordance with their GDPs, is notable 
due to how much each dollar means to its economy. For example, Albania’s GDP is less 
than 1 percent of the U.S. GDP.129 Albania is not in absolute terms contributing a large 
sum of money through this effort, but it is making a substantial effort by its percentage of 
GDP. Albania intends to increase its spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2025 in order to 
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meet modernization goals as well as Alliance defense spending goals for members.130 
This vigorous effort to allocate resources for defense has been consistent from Albania’s 
PfP days through its accession to NATO in 2009 and on to the present. 
The current balance of the categories the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) spend 
their money on is heavily weighted on personnel, which restricts their ability to 
modernize equipment and facilities. Albania plans to change this balance significantly by 
2025, getting personnel spending down to 35 percent from the 66 percent spent in 2016, 
as reflected in Table 5, so that it can open up room for infrastructure improvements and 
NATO-compatible equipment procurement. Albania also intends to use part of the 
reconfigured defense budget to invest in scientific research for defense with funding 
expected after 2020.131 This is an ambitious plan that is dependent on proper execution of 
the budget. 
Table 5.   Albanian Military Spending in 2016 132 
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The rest of the proposed use of Albania’s defense spending is outlined in its 
Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan (AFLTDP 2016–2025). The plan focuses 
on meeting needs and building capabilities based on objectives found in the country’s 
Military Strategy and National Security Strategy. Built into these strategies are the means 
to meet the needs of Albania as well as its obligations to the Alliance.133 Specific goals 
are broken down within the AFLTDP 2016–2015 by category into varying year 
segments. 
Under the training category, for example, during the first three years the plan calls 
for infrastructure improvements for three of its firing ranges and training facilities. In the 
following three years, it plans to open a new range and training center in the city of Zall-
Her. Then, in the last four years of the plan’s timespan, Albania intends to improve 
another training facility. All of these ranges and facilities are intended to follow NATO 
standardization guidelines and agreements to improve the integration ability of the AAF 
for NATO operations.134 
Land forces are another area planned for future defense spending. The first three 
years of this development is expected to produce a battalion size force of 1,000 soldiers 
able to deploy for a six-month period with combat service support from NATO. Albania 
also expects to have a Special Operations Target Unit/Group operating at NATO 
standards. In the following three years, an infantry battalion is forecast, with the ability to 
fulfill NATO assignments for a sustained six-month period. Finally, between 2022 and 
2025, land forces are expected to be operating unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned 
ground vehicles. They also plan to have a functioning tactical air control party capability 
that will enable ground forces to effectively call in air support to ground units as 
needed.135 
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These goals, along with the remaining ones outlined in the AFLTDP 2016–2025, 
provide a road map that leads to a modernized and capable military force. Some of these 
goals are highly ambitious, while others are more easily achievable. The key to 
accomplishing them as a whole is proper funding and resource allocation. Defense 
spending as of 2016 is not at the level expected by NATO, but through this plan Albania 
does expect to be spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense by 2025.136 Finances alone 
will not guarantee the fulfillment of the plan, but they constitute a key factor. 
C. CONTRIBUTIONS AND COMMITMENTS TO NATO 
Small countries within the Alliance are willing and able to contribute in big ways. 
The Albanian commitment to being a security provider in the Alliance is not only 
represented in how the country spends its money, but also in how it takes action in 
support of NATO’s core tasks of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis 
management. This section reviews the Force Goals (FG) Albania agreed with NATO to 
pursue and then examines in detail the ways in which Albania’s commitments to NATO’s 
core tasks have been fulfilled, using examples from Albania’s PfP membership and 
NATO membership through 2016, such as the Direktiva E Mbrojtjes (Defense Directive) 
for 2016. This overview of Albania’s contributions and commitments to the Alliance 
demonstrates the country’s level of involvement. 
1. Force Goals 
In 2008, as Albania prepared to enter the Alliance via an accession protocol, a 
review of its Partnership Goals (PG) commenced—laying the groundwork for Force 
Goals to be created. The difference between PGs and FGs is that PGs are specifically for 
NATO Partners. “[Albania’s] Force Goals are an advanced status of Partnership Goals in 
the sense of accountability of development of military capabilities for the collective 
defense of the Alliance.”137 The 2007 Planning and Review Process (PARP) of Albania 
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was one source used to aid in the preparation of the goals, which focused on Albania 
sharing roles, responsibilities, and burdens within the Alliance for a 10-year period—
2008–2018. Previous PG packages were developed in 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2006.138 
“NATO International Staff proposed the target FG package 2008 for Albania which had a 
final approval in [on] 22 July 2008 under silent [that is, silence] procedures with the 
Alliance.”139 The FGs are milestones that Albania accepted in its pursuit of greater 
compatibility and performance as an Alliance member in Article 5 and non-Article 5 
operations.  
There were a total of 49 Force Goals set in 2008 for Albania to accomplish in 10 
years. The breakdown of the goals is as follows: “26 of them are general and applied to 
the entire Armed Forces; 14 others are dedicated only to Land component units; 4 to 
Maritime and 5 to be applied to the Air Component.”140 Highlights of these goals include 
a 1,000-person motorized battalion group, tactical air lift to support the battle group, 
niche capabilities to support NATO operations, human intelligence and psychological 
operation capability to support the Alliance, various extreme weather uniforms, ability to 
operate in WMD-contaminated locations, and strategic and tactical cyber capabilities.141 
Most of the goals either overlap or complement the goals set forth in the AFLTDP 2016–
2025 previously mentioned.  
The modernization goals are among the key challenges faced by the Albanian 
military forces. The FG program was built with the expectation of at least 2 percent of the 
nation’s GDP being allocated for defense and 20 percent of this amount being focused on 
equipment and systems.142 Since this plan’s initiation, Albania has met neither the 2 
percent of GDP mark for the budget nor the 20 percent of defense spending mark for 







equipment.143 Albania set these goals at realistic levels as they are proportionate to other 
countries’ FGs. Croatia, for example, is a larger country and therefore has committed to a 
4,000-person battle group versus the 1,000-person battle group of Albania.144 Proper 
funding in accordance with the FG package is vital to the successful implementation of 
this plan, even though Albania’s FGs are scaled to its size and potential.  
2. Collective Defense 
Article 5 states “[t]he principle of collective defense is at the very heart of 
NATO’s founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its 
members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity 
within the Alliance.”145 To quote a recent study, “[c]ollective defense is the ultimate 
reason why the founding members formed the Alliance in 1949, and it remains NATO’s 
cornerstone, even as the Alliance has taken on additional roles and responsibilities.”146 
Collective defense is the most notable and fundamental of the three core tasks, but all of 
them have a necessary function. Along with a pledge to support fellow Allies, actions are 
required to show support. The NATO collective defense principle stood up against the 
Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1991 and endures today. As the Iron Curtain collapsed in 
Eastern Europe, collective defense provided the protection and security needed for former 
Soviet and satellite states to transition and open up to Western Europe, and for nations 
such as Albania to set a new course toward democracy.  
After the fall of Communism, Albania became involved in collective defense as a 
demonstration of the government’s willingness to reciprocate the benefits it was 
receiving through its participation in these efforts. The best example of its participation is 
the deployment of troops into Afghanistan on September 11, 2001. 
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The first time in the Alliance’s history that Article 5 had been invoked was in 
response to the 9/11 attacks. This call was answered by many members, including 
Albania after it joined the Alliance. Albania deployed 3,041 troops with the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which completed its mission in 2014. Although ISAF 
was established and maintained by UN Security Council resolutions—and not by Article 
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—it was widely recognized as consistent with NATO’s 
collective defense mission. Albania has also allowed combat aircraft to fly through its air 
space in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Except for the NATO training mission in Iraq, Iraq was not a NATO operation 
but an operation led by the United States. Albania’s contribution of troops to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom totaled 1,342 persons between 2003 and 2008.147 These force numbers in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are small compared to the tens of thousands of troops deployed to 
those countries by the United States, but they represent a significant contribution for a 
country the size of Albania, which has only approximately 14,000 active troops and 5,000 
reserve forces.148  
The size of its military has led to specialization, and Albania’s battalion of special 
forces has operated in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, and Iraq.149 In 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Albania showed its willingness to contribute to an enduring 
presence as well as to offer support in combat operations. Overall, in comparison to 
larger Alliance members, the contributions to collective defense by Albania are relatively 
small, but the state’s interest in extending its limited resources and capabilities to support 
NATO’s objectives has been clearly demonstrated. Moreover, Albania is contributing to 
NATO’s post-ISAF Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan.  
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3. Cooperative Security 
Albania is better equipped to contribute to the mission of cooperative security 
than that of collective defense. The Balkan Peninsula, where Albania is situated, is 
widely known for its long history of fighting and unrest. Stability in this region is 
important to NATO, as demonstrated by its interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia. NATO 
works with its partners and member states to promote regional security and collective 
efforts to face new security challenges as they arise.150 Albania faced regional security 
challenges in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts in the 1990s, and today faces a different 
set of challenges in the war on terrorism.  
Albania’s participation in PfP aided significantly in the stabilization of the 
Balkans. In 1994, the policy of the North Atlantic Council with regard to cooperative 
security was that partners that felt their security was threatened could reach out for 
help.151 David Yost notes that “the significance of NATO’s commitment became 
apparent on March 11, 1998, when Albania became the first partner to exercise its PfP 
emergency consultation rights.”152 Partnership for Peace is among the most notable 
means by which cooperative security is facilitated by NATO because partnerships are 
important to the Alliance’s strategic objectives. During the late 1990s, Albania benefited 
from this NATO security objective, as the nation was still transitioning from decades of 
being closed to the West.  
Since its days in PfP, Albania has become more active in cooperative security and 
is currently involved in working against Islamic terrorist threats. It has been an active 
supporter of the campaign against terrorism since 2001, and continues its participation in 
the face of new and emerging threats such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
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(ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).153 The threats present 
within Albania’s borders include foreign fighters for ISIS; arms supplies, financial 
support for terrorism; and ease of passage for terrorists moving through the Balkans. 
Albania is working in collaboration with other Allies to counter these activities and 
increase support for Allies in the region. This effort is in line with the enhancement of 
international security, a key element to cooperative security.154  
The attack that occurred in Paris in November 2015 prompted states across 
Europe to examine their security protocols, and Albania was among those with serious 
concerns associated with terrorist-related activities. Considering the strict gun control 
measures in many European states, the source of the weapons used by terrorists is still 
hotly debated. A major source is attributed to the raiding of weapons storage facilities 
throughout Albania following the uprising in response to the domestic crisis of 1997, 
which led to the theft of an estimated 100,000 weapons.155  
The Flemish Peace Institute released a study indicating that most firearms used in 
such violent attacks as the Paris shootings reach Europe via groups in the western 
Balkans, which rely on the same routes used in drug trafficking and other criminal 
activities.156 Albania has joined forces with Italian officials to interdict such activity in 
the interest of regional security,157 and the Albanian government raised the national 
threat level and deployed over 1,500 security forces domestically following the 
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November 2015 Paris attacks.158 Such responses are a prime example of cooperative 
security execution, as the availability and transport of weapons out of Albania are of 
great concern both domestically and internationally.  
Along with weapons originating in Albanian territory, there is also the problem of 
terrorist funding and a contingent of foreign fighters, numbering an estimated 500 ethnic 
Albanians and including 150 Albanian nationals, who left the Balkans to join and fight 
alongside Islamic extremists in Iraq and Syria.159 The ideology driving these fighters is 
believed to be rooted in the Balkan Wars, which were widely perceived as anti-Muslim. 
According to Epi Spahiu, the war in Bosnia resulted in the movement of several hundred 
individuals from Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, including 
veterans of Afghan jihad, into the western Balkans.160 The wide variety of ideological 
beliefs espoused by these diverse foreign fighters continues to influence the politics of 
Albania and neighboring states, and to counter these foreign fighters, Italian and 
Albanian authorities have executed operations to intercept and arrest them.161 In one 
domestic operation, Albanian officials arrested 13 people from two mosques who were 
suspected of recruiting up to 70 foreign fighters near the capital city of Tirana.162 This 
collaborative and proactive approach helps to strengthen regional security. 
Along with supplying fighters for ISIS, the financial backing of extremists is also 
found in the Balkans. Heroin alone from the Balkans is the source of over $20 billion 
annually, and proceeds from drug sales are widely known to supply terrorist 
organizations such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.163 One well-known example of illegal 
drug activity in southern Albania is the village of Lazarat, once known for legitimate 
agriculture, which is now estimated to produce over $6.1 billion worth of marijuana per 
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year,164 and where, in a single operation, federal agents burned over 11,000 cannabis 
plants in an effort to slow the production of drugs.165 The increase of counter drug 
operations not only slows the funding to terrorists, but reinforces the rule of law in 
Albania, which is vital to its status as a NATO member state.  
4. Crisis Management  
The last of the three core tasks and principles of NATO discussed in this section 
is crisis management. This core task is a major strength of NATO, as exemplified by its 
ability to employ a mixture of political and military tools before, during, and after a 
conflict or other crisis. Associated activities include conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
peace building, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations.166 The turning point in 
Albania’s involvement in crisis management operations came after the domestic crisis in 
1997, at which point Albania urgently sought to demonstrate its commitment to NATO’s 
objectives.167 
The first large-scale humanitarian crisis faced by Albania during its NATO PfP 
affiliation came from its neighbor, Kosovo. The 1998–1999 war inflicted on the residents 
of Kosovo led to a dire refugee situation involving over 600,000 people, of whom an 
estimated 375,000 traveled to Albania for help. At the time, the total population of 
Albania numbered only 3.2 million, but the country still assisted in setting up camps to 
care for the massive numbers of refugees.168 Albania’s willingness to help during the 
crisis was motivated by its partnership with NATO as well as its ethnic ties to many of 
the Kosovars, and the country’s efforts aided significantly in the humanitarian crisis, 
contributing strongly to regional stabilization efforts.  
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Another large crisis-management operation to which Albania has committed 
support is in Afghanistan, contributing to combat operations in the country even after the 
downsizing of ISAF forces. In support of the ISAF mission, Albania deployed 330 forces 
to Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar.169 After decades of war and internal strife, Afghanistan is 
a war-torn country in which NATO efforts are vital to achieving stability.  
Once again, the number of troops provided by Albania to this NATO mission is 
small in absolute terms in comparison with larger Allies, but the effort on a proportional 
basis has been sincere, constant, and significant. A recent survey found that 89 percent of 
Albanians support their country’s allegiance to NATO and its operations.170 This amount 
of public support for NATO is consistent with the government’s interests. The number 
two priority of the Albanian Ministry of Defence’s 2016 strategy, second only to 
improved operability and interoperability, is fulfilling the country’s commitments within 
the Alliance.171 Crisis management is certainly one of the areas of support to which 
Albania has demonstrated its willingness and ability to commit its resources. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
The core of many of the limiting factors to Albania’s performance is economics. 
Albania suffers from a weak economy, leaving it far behind western European nations. 
Even though Albania has closed the gap in recent years, since 2011 its progress has 
slowed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports that other factors holding 
Albania back include infrastructure gaps, unreliable energy supplies, low levels of 
physical and human capital, weak institutions, weak enforcement of the rule of law, and 
corruption. The last three factors contribute to a breakdown in property rights 
protection.172 The macro- and microeconomic conditions also represent major constraints 
on Albania’s long-term ability to increase its contributions to NATO efforts and core 
tasks. All of these areas must be addressed in order for Albania to meet its committed FG 
program and its obligations to the Alliance.  
One indirect implication of the strained economic condition of Albania is its low 
compensation of its military members. Salaries for soldiers are low in comparison to the 
average worker in the country, to say nothing of comparisons with other Alliance 
members’ militaries. This limits the government’s ability to recruit and retain high-
quality personnel. Albania’s soldiers fight side by side with their Alliance counterparts, 
but face an apparent deficiency in compensation. This is one of many drawbacks to the 
low, but steadily growing, economic performance in Albania.  
Military pay along with all of the areas discussed in the beginning of this chapter 
must be addressed in order for Albania to meet its committed FG program and its 
obligations to the Alliance. Continued efforts help in showing the Alliance that Albania is 
capable of performing as a security provider and not just a security consumer. In 2016, 
the Albanian Ministry of Defence directed implementation of several strategic initiatives 
to accelerate the nation’s military transformation as well as the various modernization 
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programs. Albania is on an ambitious but achievable course to continue increasing and 
improving its capabilities within the Alliance for decades to come.173  
As noted in the Chapter I, Ivo Daalder argued in 1999 that the inclusion of more 
members could weaken the Alliance’s ability to fulfill its ultimate role of collective 
defense.174 In Daalder’s words, “an expansion of NATO’s purpose and membership risks 
not only increased dissension among the allies but also dissipation of the Atlantic 
Alliance’s ability to meet its fundamental collective defense tasks.”175 This thesis, 
through the study of Albania, demonstrates that a small and economically challenged 
country can still manage to become a productive member of NATO.  
The most important contribution that Albania makes to the Alliance is its key role 
in regional security and stabilization. Scholars and policymakers have widely credited 
Albania with playing a crucial role in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, as 
exemplified by its involvement in supporting Kosovo’s independence (without 
irredentism or interference in local politics) and in building and consolidating multiethnic 
states in Macedonia and Montenegro.176 As Albania continues to strengthen politically, 
economically, and militarily, the country will progressively expand the scope of its 
participation in NATO activities and operations. This case study provides evidence that 
justifies confidence in the larger Alliance members that the smaller Allies are genuine 
assets upon which the Alliance can call and depend on when needed. 
A. NATO ENLARGEMENT DISCUSSION 
Enlargement is an ongoing topic of debate among experts, and it includes the 
question of adding small states to the Alliance. The arguments concern whether to 
enlarge the Alliance or to keep the current membership configuration. While some 
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scholars debate the functions and even the existence of the organization as a whole, this 
thesis focuses on whether to enlarge the Alliance through additional small states.  
The pro-enlargement side of the debate believes that small states provide 
advantages to NATO, which differ with each nation. These advantages include 
geographically important locations, regional expertise in dealing with crises, niche 
capability specializations, vigorous participation and spending, and extending the borders 
of the Alliance, aiding in more rapid responses to crisis situations. Large and wealthy 
states such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are easily able to show 
their significance as Alliance members, but the contributions of small states are debated. 
The side of the debate critical of enlargement is focused on the negative effects 
that new Allies could have and have had on the Alliance and the negative effects on the 
new Allies themselves due to joining NATO. Some observers have argued that one of the 
negative effects consists, of potential political strains in states seeking EU membership, 
obliging them to choose between the varying agendas of these two international 
organizations. As the Alliance pushes farther east, some experts are concerned about the 
potential provocation of Russia in the Baltic region and Ukraine.  
Finally, the most common argument against further enlargement is that, according 
to some experts, small states are more likely to be security consumers than providers due 
to the small size of their militaries and their inability to properly protect themselves. This 
imbalance in capabilities is partially due to larger and wealthier states having large 
militaries and GDPs that enable them to project power globally as Alliance members. The 
genuine contributions of small states such as Albania are easily overlooked due to the 
size and scope of their capabilities.  
B. NATO AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY EXAMINATION 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization includes states of all sizes and levels of 
economic and military power. The North Atlantic Treaty is the document that binds these 
states together, providing a guidebook on what is expected of each member. The Alliance 
itself is constantly transforming through the accession of new members and the onset of 
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new security challenges. Each article of the treaty is important in the shaping of 
additional guidance while keeping all members on the same course. 
The Alliance relies not only on the treaty; it also relies on the 2010 Strategic 
Concept and the core tasks specified in that document to guide its focus, which is 
ultimately derived from the treaty. Collective defense is one of those core tasks and is 
NATO’s fundamental purpose, but since the early 1990s day-to-day operations have 
involved the other core tasks more prominently. The Allies have re-emphasized collective 
defense since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. The addition of new members 
and partners continually changes the territory and responsibilities of the Alliance while 
simultaneously increasing its capabilities. Small members have proven able and willing 
to stand up as needed to fulfill the objectives of the Alliance. 
C. SUMMARY 
Albania’s contributions to NATO are growing stronger in the face of new threats. 
The country’s location in the Mediterranean region provides a strategic position from 
which to address terrorist activities there. In a 2015 meeting with U.S. Secretary of State 
John Kerry, Ditmir Buschati—the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs—”reiterated the 
commitment of the Albanian government to continue being a strong partner of the U.S., 
in terms of stability, peace, and prosperity in our region and beyond, as well as in the 
fight against terrorism, violent extremism, and protection of human rights.”177 Albania 
backs up its message with action, as seen in anti-terrorism activities such as intercepting 
foreign fighters and shutting down networks of arms supplies and financing for terrorism 
domestically.  
D. LIMITING FACTORS  
In order to completely meet the goals set forth by Albania and the promises it has 
made to the Alliance, Albania will need to address a few issues that are mostly connected 
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with financing. Albania has by far the weakest economy among the Allies. The limited 
amount of money going toward defense spending is a result of several limiting factors 
that hinder Albania’s economic performance. Albania’s economy is steadily increasing, 
but it has a long way to go to catch up to the rest of the Alliance. Key areas that need to 
be addressed to aid in this performance improvement include infrastructure shortfalls, 
unreliable energy supplies, low levels of physical and human capital, weak institutions, 
uneven enforcement of the rule of law, and corruption.178 Once some of these issues are 
improved and the economy progresses, more money will be available to further aid 
Albania in its ability to contribute to the Alliance.  
Moreover, the Albanian authorities intend to address the distribution imbalance in 
funds already allocated for defense spending. As of 2016, the majority of the budget was 
going toward personnel rather than to equipment, training, research and development, and 
infrastructure. In order to fix the imbalance, there needs to be more overall funding for 
the military.  
Although the higher percentage of funds is going toward personnel, which 
includes the paying salaries and pensions, it is too low, resulting in low salaries paid to 
military members. As noted previously, a soldier’s salary is lower in comparison to even 
the average worker’s pay in the country. An Albanian soldier’s pay does not compare to 
that of many other Alliance members’ militaries. This deficiency is more apparent the 
more Albanian forces participate in Alliance operations and fill the same roles as their 
better-compensated counterparts. This barrier limits the government’s ability to recruit 
and retain high-quality personnel. Albania is at risk of recruiting and retaining less-
qualified people while the better-qualified citizens look for civilian work domestically 
and abroad. This is one of many drawbacks to the poor economic performance of 
Albania, despite its steady growth.  
Addressing these economic and domestic issues is crucial for Albania to meet its 
set Force Goals and obligations to the Alliance. Failure to make improvements will lend 
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fuel to the argument that small states are consumers of security more than providers. To 
meet its set goals, defense spending must reach a minimum of 2 percent of Albania’s 
GDP. Also, improvements are needed to increase the country’s GDP.  
Albania has a solid plan in place to improve its position through various strategies 
and initiatives. If Albania continues domestic improvements and sticks to funding and 
fulfilling its plans, such as the Armed Forces Long-Term Development plan 2016–2015, 
it will continue to be a positive contributor to the Alliance.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research on this topic would be most effectively conducted through 
individual interviews of Albanian military members and government officials. The ability 
to retrieve first-hand accounts regarding the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) from 
officials at various levels would strengthen future research efforts. The AAF is a small 
community of fewer than 15,000 active troops and it would not take a large pool of 
people to design a sound research effort to derive new insights on this topic. This 
research also could be broadened to other small Allies such as Croatia, which also 
entered the Alliance in 2009. At the time of this writing, Montenegro is still scheduled to 
enter the Alliance. This would also constitute an apt case to examine in the future. 
Performing a two- or three-member comparison could be fruitful in an effort to assess the 
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